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Def endants-1 Respondents.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Proceedings Below
The proceedings below are adequately set forth in
plaintiff^appellant's principal brief and will not be restated
here.
Statement of Facts
Plaintiff's statement of facts appears in its principal
brief.

The facts of this case are almost entirely undisputed.

Plaintiff takes exception with a comment in defendant's
statement of facts to the effect that neither the uniform real
estate contract represented by exhibit 4, nor any notice of
contract was recorded.

The record is simply silent on that

1

issue.

There is no evidence to support a conclusion that the

contract or a notice of interest was not recorded.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant challenges plaintiff's arguments on two grounds:
1)

that the assignment of the interest of defendant Gunterman

in the subject trust deed to defendant Pack did not constitute
a "conveyance;1' and, 2) that defendant Pack did not purchase an
interest in the real property.

The basis for defendant's

arguments is a statement in 59 C.J.S. Mortgages §196 that the
interest of a beneficiary under a trust deed is personal
property.

The interest of a mortgagee is also personal

property.

Although a mortgagee or a beneficiary under a trust

deed may not have a legal estate in the subject real property,
nonetheless, the mortgagee or beneficiary does have an
"interest" in the subject real property and the subsequent
assignment thereof is a "conveyance" within the meaning of Utah
Code Anno. §§57*1*1 and 57*3-3.

Likewise, the mortgagee or

beneficiary, as well as an assignee of the mortgagee or
beneficiary, is a purchaser of the real property within the
meaning of Utah Code Anno. .§57*3*3.
Defendant has not challenged plaintiff's other arguments
and consequently those arguments are not addressed in this
brief.
ARGUMENT
THE ASSIGNMENT OF DEFENDANT GUNTERMAN'S INTEREST UNDER
2

THE SUBJECT DEED OF TRUST TO DEFENDANT PACK CONSTITUTED A
CONVEYANCE OF AN INTEREST IN REAL ESTATE WITHIN THE MEANING
OF UTAH CODE ANNO. §57*1*1 AND DEFENDANT PACK WAS A
SUBSEQUENT PURCHASER IN GOOD FAITH OF THE SUBJECT REAL
ESTATE WITHIN THE MEANING OF UTAH CODE ANNO. §57-3-3.
This appeal centers on the construction and effect of Utah
Code Anno. §57-3*3 which reads as follows:
Every conveyance of real estate hereafter made, which
shall not be recorded as provided in this title, shall be
void as against any subsequent purchaser in good faith and
for valuable consideration of the same real estate, or any
portion thereof, where his own conveyance shall be first
duly recorded.
Plaintiff argues that the assignment of the subject trust
deed by defendant Gunterman to defendant Pack was a conveyance
of real estate and that defendant Pack was a subsequent
purchaser in good faith for valuable consideration of the same
real estate within the meaning of Utah Code Anno. §57-*3**3.
Accordingly, plaintiff's title would then be subject to the
interest of defendant Pack inasmuch as the deed of partial
release and reconveyance was recorded after the recordation of
the assignment by defendant Gunterman to defendant Pack.

The

defendant opposes plaintiff's argument on two grounds which are
essentially the same:

1)

that the assignment of the trust

deed from defendant Gunterman to defendant Pack was not a
"conveyance"; and, 2)

that defendant Pack was not a purchaser

of "the same real estate" within the meaning of Utah Code Anno.
§57-3^3.

The defendant argues that the interest of defendant

Gunterman was personal property and that, therefore, an
assignment of the same did not constitute a conveyance of real
3

estate, nor did it constitute defendant Pack a purchaser of
real estate.

Plaintiff cites as authority for that proposition

59 C.J.S. Mortgages §196 which states:
The cestui que trust, or beneficiary in a deed of trust
given as security for a debt has no title to, or estate
in, the property covered by the deed, or at least he has
no legal title or ownership and it has been held that he
has no equitable title, but a holding to the contrary has
also been made. He has only a lien or a secured chose in
action, and he has an interest only to the extent that he
can cause the trustee to sell the land and apply the
proceeds to the payment of the secured debt. Such
interest is personal property.
It is not contended that either a mortagee or a
beneficiary under a trust deed holds a legal estate in the real
property.

However, the lien imposed by the mortgage or trust

deed gives the mortgagee or beneficiary under a trust deed an
interest in the real estate within the meaning of Utah Code
Anno. §57-*l-l. That section reads as follows:
The term "conveyance" as used in this title shall be
construed to embrace every instrument in writing by which
any real estate, or interest in real estate, is created,
aliened, mortgaged, encumbered or assigned, except wills,
and leases for a term not exceeding one year. (Emphasis
added.)
If this court were to adopt the rationale of defendant
that the beneficiary of a trust deed has no interest in the
real estate, then the court would have to hold that the
recording statute, Utah Code Anno. §57*3-43, does not apply to
mortgages.

In 59 C.J.S. Mortgages §195, it states:

A mortgage of property is not itself, real property, but
is personal property, it being considered in some states
as a mere chose in action. So too, for most purposes, the
4

right or interest of the mortgagee under the mortgage is
regarded as personal property
If the mortgagee's interest were determined to be personal
property for purposes of Utah Code Anno. §57-0^3, then there
would be no record priority of mortgages because subsequent
mortgagees would not be considered purchasers "of the same real
estate."

However, that is obviously not the law.

A mortgagee

is considered to be a purchaser of the real estate and his
mortgage lien has priority over subsequently recorded
mortgages.

In Federal Land Bank of Berkeley v. Pace, 87 Utah

156, 48 P.2d 480 (1935) the court stated:
There is no question but that a mortgage lien is included
in the term "conveyance" as used in §78*3-^3, and that a
mortgagee is a purchaser, and the law of priority of
record, in its general principle, applies to mortgages as
well as deeds.
48 P.2d at 482. Section 78-0-0, cited by the court, refers to
Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, and is identical to the current
Utah Code Anno. §57-3-*3 quoted above.

Consequently, a

mortgagee and a beneficiary of a trust deed are purchasers of
real estate within the meaning of Utah Code Anno. §57*3*3, and
a purchaser of a mortgage or beneficial interest under a trust
deed is also a purchaser of the same real estate.
In Kemp v. Zions First National Bank, 24 Utah 2d 288, 470
P.2d 390 (1970) the court discussed the relative priorities of
a purchase money mortgage granted to the seller, and a later
executed, but earlier recorded, trust deed granted to a bank.
The court therein equated a trust deed with a mortgage and
5

observed that the vendor, who executed a warranty deed and took
back a mortgage, "retained and interest in the property."
We have been shown no authority which approves giving
preference to a purchase money mortgagee ...: where such
claimants had given an unrestricted warranty deed, knowing
that the financing bank was going to rely on it; where the
bank had neither actual nor constructive knowledge that
the vendor retained an interest in the property, and the
latter, who had failed to record their own mortgage, in
full knowledge of the facts, went to the bank and in
effect approved the transaction by accepting their share
of the proceeds therefrom, but without disclosing that
they retained an interest. (Emphasis added.)
470 P.2d at 393.
The court's finding in both Pace and Kemp that a mortgagee
has an interest in the real property, effectuates the purpose
of the recording statutes.

The purpose of the recording

statutes is to put persons dealing with a particular property
on notice of outstanding interests which may have attached
thereto.

It cannot be disputed that the priority of a mortgage

is determined in relation to when it was recorded.
Subsequently recorded mortgages are subject to prior recorded
mortgages.

The same is true with respect to an assignment of a

mortgage or trust deed.

The assignee of the mortgage or trust

deed is entitled to rely upon the record to determine the
priority of the mortgage or trust deed being assigned as well
as its validity.

Defendant Pack was entitled to rely upon the

state of the record at the time he received and paid for an
assignment of defendant Gunterman's beneficial interest under
the trust deed.

As noted in plaintiff's principal brief, the
6

recordation of an assigment of a mortgage or trust deed puts
the world on notice of the interest of the assignee.

If the

fee title holder thereafter obtains a release from the original
mortgagee, and subsequently sells the property, the buyer takes
it subject to the interest of the assignee of the mortgagee.
Utah Code Anno. §57*1*36 provides in part that an
"assignment of a beneficial interest under a trust deed, ...
shall be entitled to be recorded, and shall, from the time of
filing the same with the recorder for record, impart notice of
the contents thereof to all persons, including subsequent
purchasers and encumbrancers for value...."

In 89 ALR 190 it

states:
The recording of the assignment operates as notice to all
of the assignee's rights as against any subsequent acts of
the mortgagee affecting the mortgage. Thus, it protects
them against a subsequent assignment of the mortgage.
It also protects him against a subsequent and unauthorized
discharge and release of the mortgage by the mortgagee.
Defendant is attempting to persuade the court that the
recordation of an assignment of the beneficial interest under a
trust deed does not affect the real property and that therefore
the recordation of such an assignment is meaningless.
Obviously that position is without merit in light of the
provisions of Utah Code Anno. §57^1^36.
In any event, the assignment of the trust deed from
defendant Gunterman to defendant Pack was an assignment of an
interest in real estate pursuant to Utah Code Anno. §57*1-1 and
7

hence was a "conveyance" within the meaning of Utah Code Anno.
§57^3-3.

Consequently, plaintiff's title to the subject

property was encumbered by the interest of defendant Pack
because pursuant to Utah Code Anno. §57*3-3, the partial
reconveyance by the trustee was void as to defendant Pack's
interest.

Therefore, plaintiff was required to bring an action

to quiet title to the subject property and is entitled to
damages against defendant D Land Title Company as outlined more
fully in plaintiff's principal brief.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, plaintiff respectfully requests
that the court reverse the judgment of the lower court with
respect to plaintiff's claims against defendant 3D Land Title
Company and enter judgment in favor of plaintiff and against
defendant D Land Title Company in the sum of $2,300 plus
accrued interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of
judgment.
Dated:

dllltU^t^

&

1986.
Respectfully submitted,
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